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Explanations are like salted peanuts*
On why you can't cut the route toward further reduction
Daniel Cohnitz
1. The Pragmatics of Explanation
Take a look at these four situations:
Figure 1
All of these situations have certain features in common: in all of them an
explanation is asked for, in all of them an explanation is given, and all these
explanations are literally false (although in different ways).
That they are literally false can be justified in each of the four situations:
there are moral, pedagogical, rational-egoistic, epistemic and other context-
dependent reasons for us not to tell the literal truth sometimes. This is what I
call the pragmatic aspect of explanations. Besides all the different adequacy
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criteria that we have for an ideal scientific explanation, there is always a
bundle of context-dependent pragmatic criteria that determine what counts
as a good explanation in a certain situation.
Although all this is granted, there is nevertheless the idea of a normative,
regulative model of scientific explanation, which is not context-dependent.
We might be justified in making certain false claims in a situation in which
we are asked for an explanation, but nevertheless we should not dream of
calling these claims 'complete scientific explanations'. One of these ideal
explanatory schemas was described by Carl Gustav Hempel and further de-
veloped by Peter Railton. On both views there is a set of adequacy criteria
that are meant to be necessary as well as sufficient conditions, given as an
explication of the concept of scientific explanation.
A common feature of both accounts is that they demand truth for every
sentence of the explanans. Railton is even more rigorous in this respect than
Hempel, since the invocation of the truth-requirement leads him to dismiss
Hempel's model for inductive explanations. In the next section (2) I shall
give a brief outline of what we mean by an ideal scientific explanation and
of the reasons that count in favor of such a regulative construction. The
model (as I shall defend it) is in a certain way mildly reductionistic, i.e. it
supports the following claims:
(I) If some explanatory mechanism M can be reduced to some more
fundamental mechanism M', any explanation E' referring to M' con-
tains more information about the ideal explanatory text than any ex-
planation E referring to M.1
(II) If some explanation E' contains more information about the ideal
explanatory text than some rival explanation E, E' has a higher ex-
planatory value than E.2
Prima facie it does not seem very problematic to argue in favor of these
claims. Depending on how we want to define an "explanatory mechanism",
an "ideal explanatory text", and the notion of "explanatory value", both
claims could simply turn out to be trivial tautologies. Nevertheless, Robert
Batterman attacked the latter claim (which is indeed not vacuously true by
definition, as we shall see) in various papers3, trying to show by way of ex-
amples that explanations exist which cannot be surpassed by explanations
revealing more of the ideal explanatory text. In section (3) I shall summarize
Batterman's criticism and discuss his alternative model of scientific expla-
nation. The arguments in section (4) are a defence of the ideal explanatory
text-conception against Batterman's points.
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2. Ideal Scientific Explanations
The main idea behind the ideal explanatory text account is that all scientific
explanations are deductive-nomological in structure. Another basic condi-
tion is the above mentioned truth requirement for all sentences contained in
the explanans. The latter seems to be an overwhelmingly plausible con-
straint: the lies of figure 1 are of course all designed to satisfy the questioner
(at least temporarily), nevertheless they do not fulfill the purpose the ques-
tioner expects them to (that's why we make such a big moral deal out of ly-
ing): they do not answer his question, they just make him stop asking. But
complete scientific explanations should (at least) do the former, they should
indeed answer our questions.
The idea that all scientific explanations have a deductive-nomological
structure may need further explaining. Hempel's original account has to deal
with many well-known counterexamples, all of which were designed either
to show that Hempel's adequacy criteria exclude bona fide explanations, or
to imply look-a-likes which are in no way explanatory.4 So why stick to the
deductive nomological idea and even expand it? Peter Railton thinks (on my
view correctly) that Hempel's famous model needs only one additional re-
quirement to be able to deal with all this criticism.
2.1 Hempel's Ideal
Hempel's explication of the concept of scientific explanation distinguishes
between deductive-nomological (DN) explanations of general regularities,
DN explanations of particular facts, deductive-statistical (DS) explanations
of general regularities, and inductive-statistical (IS) explanations of par-
ticular facts. The first three are adequate scientific explanations in Hempel's
mind iff (if and only if) they have the structure of a deductively valid and
sound argument with the explanandum (regularity or fact to be explained) as
the conclusion, and at least one (either deterministic or, in the case of a de-
ductive-statistical explanation, probabilistic) law among its premises which
is necessary to derive the conclusion from the set of premises (that form the
so called explanans). The latter type, an inductive-statistical explanation, is
an adequate scientific explanation iff it has the structure of an inductively
valid (the premises support the conclusion with a probability r = 1 − ε for
some small number ε) and sound argument with the explanandum (the par-
ticular occurrence) as conclusion. Again it is demanded that it has at least
one (statistical) law among its premises which is necessary to infer the con-
clusion from the set of premises, and, additionally, that this set contains the
strongest information statistically relevant for the occurrence of the explan-
andum that is currently available relative to our background knowledge. The
last requirement is also known as the requirement of maximal specificity
(RMS).
It is obvious, even from this short summary, that IS-explanations play a
rather unique role in Hempel's explication. They are not conceived as de-
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ductive arguments and because of the requirement of maximal specificity
they are even nonmonotonic: in a different epistemic situation, with new
evidence about the statistically relevant factors for the explanandum to oc-
cur, new premises might undermine the support for the conclusion. Hem-
pel’s idea that predictions and explanations are structurally identical5 leads
him to demand a high probability (r = 1 − ε for some small number ε) for
the explanandum's occurrence relative to the explanans. The oddest conse-
quence of this is surely that very unlikely chance events become inexplica-
ble in principle, although the process that brought them about is in no way
mysterious, but might be perfectly understood.6
2.2 Railton's Ideal
Railton’s basic idea to address these oddities and counterexamples is that
chance phenomena, even very unlikely ones, can be explained by subsuming
them under irreducibly probabilistic laws in a deductive fashion. Hence the
name of his account: deductive-nomological model of probabilistic expla-
nation (DNP).
It should be emphasized that only genuinely probabilistic laws are con-
sidered as candidates for a DNP-explanans. In a strong interpretation this is
already a consequence of Hempel’s account7, given RMS, the truth require-
ment, and Hempel’s propensity interpretation of probabilities. But it is also
intuitively evident: an event that merely appears to be a chance event cannot
be explained statistically, for no probabilistic laws would govern it.8
This is still not enough to rule out the counterexamples directed against
the DN-structure itself, counterexamples showing that adequate DN-
"explanations" are not always explanatory. Instead of invoking some causal
relevance criterion, Railton demands that the laws cited in the explanans are
to be derived from our theoretical account of the mechanism(s) at work for
the occurrence of the phenomenon to be explained. The reference to this
mechanism(s) informs us about how the phenomenon came about, not why
it was to be expected. Hempel stressed the latter point, whereas the first
seems to be the one asked for.
These features (deductive structure, reference to the mechanism(s) at
work) solve most if not all of Hempel’s original problems with the IS-
model: first, it is now possible to explain even unlikely chance events, sec-
ond, RMS, and hence the relativity of an explanation to an epistemic situa-
tion vanish, and non-explanatory "explanations" are all filtered out. The lat-
ter was also a problem of the original DN-model, which is in Railton's ac-
count equally backed up by the mechanism(s) at work. Hence the schematic
structure of Railton's DN-model of scientific explanation can be regimented
like this:
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(1) Deductive-Nomological-model for the explanation of non-chance
events
(1a) A theoretical derivation of a deterministic law of the form (1b).
(1b) ∀x ∀t [Fx,t → Gx,t + θ]; θ ≥ 0
(1c) Fe,t0
(1d) Ge,t0 + θ
(1a) is a derivation of the deterministic law from our theoretical account of
the mechanism(s) at work which guarantees the relevance and explanatori-
ness of the covering law. (1b) is the law itself, with the two place predicates
F and G which are properties had by whatever the variable x or the constant
e stands for at some time t (e.g., "x has the property F at t"), and the time-
interval θ. (1c) states the initial conditions, and finally the explanandum (1d)
is deductively derived from (1b) and (1c).
This differs from Hempel's structure only in (1a), the backup of the ex-
plaining law. Obviously more changes are to be made when it comes to the
explanation of probabilistic events. Here the model looks like this:
(2) Deductive-Nomological-Probabilistic-model for the explanation
 of chance events
(2a) A theoretical derivation of a probabilistic law of the form (2b).
(2b) ∀x ∀t [Fx,t → Prob(Gx,t + θ) = r]; θ ≥ 0
(2c) Fe,t0
(2d) Prob(Ge,t0 + θ) = r
(2e) (Ge,t0 + θ) / ¬(Ge,t0 + θ)
Again (2a) embeds the probabilistic law into the mechanism at work, (2b)
states the probabilistic law9, and (2c) the initial conditions. (2d) ascribes a
probability to a single case, derived from (2b) and (2c) via universal instan-
tiation and modus ponens. The parenthetic addendum (2e) finally states how
things turned out at t0 + θ. (2e) – the explanandum – is neither deductively
nor inductively inferred from the explanans. But since it is a true chance
event, it should not be derivable at all, by any set of initial conditions, and
any empirical law.
We knew (2e) when we asked for an explanation, thus it doesn't carry
any new information and is dispensable. Nevertheless, if we want to connect
our explanation (2) with the explanation of any event caused by some in-
stantiation of (2e) nearby, we will need the parenthetic addendum to connect
the explanations in such a case. To model probabilistic explanations in this
way means giving up their argument structure which was a special feature of
Hempel's account. The explanandum is no consequence of the explanans-
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premises anymore. At the same time this means losing the structural identity
of explanations and predictions. But both consequences of Railton's account
do not harm in any way the explanatory virtues of explanations so con-
ceived.
The structures (1) and (2) are both to be understood as ideals. They pro-
vide the skeletal form of what we call ideal explanatory texts. An ideal ex-
planatory text fully spelled out for some causal process would be
an inter-connected series of law-based accounts of all the nodes
and links in the causal network culminating in the explanandum,
complete with a fully detailed description of the causal mecha-
nisms involved and theoretical derivations of all the covering
laws involved. This full-blown causal account would extend, via
various relations of reduction and supervenience, to all levels of
analysis, i.e., the ideal text would be closed under relations of
causal dependence, reduction, and supervenience.10
Of course, such an ideal explanatory text can never be put down on paper.
The text might be infinite (if time is continuous, even non-denumerably in-
finite) and hence not anything anyone actually demands from any particular
scientific explanation. What is in fact demanded from a scientific explana-
tion, is that it reveals parts of the ideal explanatory text, that it carries in-
formation about the ideal explanatory text. We call this explanatory infor-
mation. Again the idea behind this notion is fairly straightforward:
Consider some ideal explanatory text for the explanation of fact p. Now
consider any statement S that, were we ignorant about this text, but conver-
sant in the language and the concepts employed in it and in S, S would re-
duce our uncertainty about the content or features of the explanatory text. If
we model this reduced uncertainty by sets of eliminated possibilities, S pro-
vides explanatory information concerning why p to the extend S eliminates
possibilities concerning the explanatory text.11
With the help of the latter notion we are now able to talk of degrees of
explanatoriness. This allows us to identify the explanatory value of all bona
fide explanations which are not 'complete'. Putting the pragmatic and cir-
cumstantial aspects of particular explanations in their right places, it seems
that this account can cope with all tentative counterexamples perfectly.
Well, Robert Batterman doesn't think so.
4. Batterman's Challenge
Consider the chaos game:
[Mark off three] vertices of a triangle on a piece of paper. Label
them 1, 2, and 3. Choose one point as your starting place, and
start tossing a 3-sided die. […] Suppose that your starting point
is 1 and the first roll lands on the side marked 3. You must put a
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point midway between your starting point 1 and the point
marked 3. On the next roll, put a point halfway between this
new point and the point assigned to the number rolled, and so
on.12
After playing this game for a sufficiently long time, the following fractal
pattern occurs, produced by apparently random placements of dots:
Figure 2. Sierpinski Triangle13
It appears that patterns resulting from different plays of the chaos game all
instantiate the same fractal dimension. How do these patterns emerge? Why
do they all have the same fractal dimension? According to Batterman, the
answers to these questions cannot be provided by any ideal explanatory text.
Before I enter into the discussion of why Batterman thinks that phenom-
ena like the patterns of the chaos game cannot be explained by some ideal
explanatory text, let me add two methodological remarks:
1) The reader might be concerned about the fact that the chaos game
seems more like a theoretical math problem than a counterexample
taken from some empirical science. To be fair, Batterman takes the
chaos game as a mere illustration of his point and even emphasizes
the fact that it is "unphysical".14 It must be noted however, that there
is a way to treat the chaos game as a physical problem, i.e. the way
Batterman treats the problem. Since this example is indeed illustra-
tive, I will use it as well. The fact that it is in any sense "unphysical"
will not harm the point I wish to make.15
2) Batterman wants to show that there are explanatory why-questions
that cannot be answered by an ideal explanatory text. Thus it is not
sufficient to show that there are explanations other than that which
are shorter. As a matter of fact the ideal explanatory text-conception
emphasizes that all actual explanations are shorter than the ideal ex-
planatory text.
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It indeed appears that Batterman found an explanandum in the chaos game
which is not explicable by an ideal explanatory text. The question
(Q) Why is it that, in general, sequences of dice rolls normally produce
patterns like these (e.g. with such and such fractal dimension)?
seems to be an interesting "explanatory why-question", something we
should have an answer for. But, quite remarkably, the correct answer is al-
legedly not the ideal explanatory text, the answer cannot even be formulated
as an ideal explanatory text. How can we account for this?
The single results of throwing a die are usually not considered to be re-
sults of a irreducibly probabilistic process. In fact we often hear that, given
complete information about all initial and boundary conditions and detailed
knowledge of the throwing mechanism, we can accurately predict the result
of each dice throw with certainty. Unlike irreducibly probabilistic processes,
we assume hidden parameters here. Given a propensity interpretation of sin-
gle case probabilities, to ascribe the probability 1/6 to the result that the die
will land on "2" the next throw (again, with a normal die), is literally false:
since the process is assumed to be fully determined by the initial and bound-
ary conditions and the laws of classical mechanics, the probability that the
die lands on whatever is only either 1 or 0.
Based on these assumptions, Batterman tries to show the insufficiency of
the ideal explanatory text-model for explaining the observed regular pat-
terns. Since the underlying process of a dice roll is assumed to be essentially
deterministic, the ideal explanatory text cannot be probabilistic, and thus
must be DN (compare schema (1)). But what should a DN-text that could
account for the general pattern look like? Each dot in a Sierpinski triangle is
the result of a single dice throw. Hence an explanation of any certain dot
should consist of a deductive nomological explanation of the result of the
roll, plus the rules of the game. By connecting all DN-texts together for each
single roll and dot, we will get one large explanatory text that explains the
occurrence of a single token of this pattern, the result of one play of the
game. Is this the explanans we were looking for? Of course not. This would
explain the coming about of a token of this pattern of such and such fractal
dimension, not the general realizations of a type we were interested in. In-
deed this latter question, as expressed by Q, is informative: not all conceiv-
able sequences of dice throws would result in this pattern.16 It seems that the
only way to account for this phenomenon with an ideal explanatory text
would be to ascribe a probability to each sequence of dice throws (each play
of the game) to yield our pattern. But what underlying causal mechanism
postulated would make such a theory derivable? Unfortunately there is no
known theory that could satisfy this demand.
This is, essentially, Batterman's counterexample against the ideal ex-
planatory text-conception. He then goes on to present how we in fact ex-
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plain the general occurrence of these patterns using the Strong Law of Large
Numbers (SLLN). First it is noted that the sequences of dice throws are
Bernoulli sequences, i.e. every probability of a given outcome on a given
trial is independent of the probability of any other trial in a sequence of
throws. This makes the laws of large numbers applicable:
Using the SLLN, it is possible to provide an apparently I-S-like
explanation for the generic appearance of the triangle pattern by
demonstrating that such patterns are highly probable in an en-
semble of sequences of the kind described. In fact, one argues
that the probability of realizing an instance of the pattern is
one.17
Note that this "probability one" assertion in this "I-S-like" explanation has a
measure theoretic meaning. It is not synonymous with "with certainty"
(since we can conceive certain orderly sequences that would not yield the
pattern). Such probabilities cannot be part of ideal explanatory texts. Prob-
abilities can enter into an ideal explanatory text only if the phenomenon in
question is irreducibly probabilistic (which is, by assumption, not the case).
Batterman goes on to show that physics is full of examples of structurally
identical explanations. Two features are common ingredients of all these
cases:
(i) An assessment of the probabilities that the initial and boundary con-
ditions are distributed in a certain way (analogous to our statement
that a sequence of dice throws has the Bernoulli property).
(ii) A proof that under iteration or toward a certain time limit a process
starting with the probabilities for the distribution of initial and
boundary conditions mentioned in (i) results in a certain macro-
phenomenon (analogous to the application of SLLN in the Sierpin-
ski-example).
On the ideal explanatory text account one would have to question the status
of the probability assertions in (i). To clarify whether and where they occur
in the text, we have to see whether they are irreducible. Batterman's exam-
ples are all within the classical domain, hence they are clearly not irreduci-
ble. So we would have to replace them with DN-accounts for the occurrence
of the particular initial and boundary conditions. After this replacement (ii)
would not apply anymore (the probabilities the law would depart from are
gone). Instead we would replace (ii) with the covering deterministic law.
Again we arrive at (complete) explanations of singular occurrences, but
would not yet arrive at an account for the properties shared by all these oc-
currences. If we wanted to regiment Batterman's alternative model, we
would get something like this:
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(3) Statistical-Deterministic-model for the explanation of non-chance
events
(3a) A demonstration, through an analysis of the system's (e) lawlike dy-
namical instability, that e possesses certain strong statistical proper-
ties SP which results in (3b).
(3b) SPe,t0
(3c) ∀x ∀t [SPx,t → Prob(Gx,t + θ) = 1]; θ ≥ 0
                                                                                                         [r = 1]
(3d) Ge,t0 + θ
Again, (3b) corresponds to the Bernoulli property of the sequences of dice
throws, (3c) to SLLN, which allows us to infer (inductively) with "probabil-
ity one" that our system will exhibit the crucial pattern (as stated in (3d)). At
least this is how I would interpret Batterman's own explication of his model:
[The theoretical derivation from underlying theory as demanded
by the DNP model] corresponds to the demonstration [(3a)],
through an analysis of the system's lawlike dynamical instabil-
ity, that the system possesses strong statistical properties [(3b)].
[…] The second important feature […] is the derivation of a
"probability one" assertion from a statement to the effect that the
system has such a statistical property, together with a mathe-
matical proposition; namely a measure-theoretic limit theorem
such as the SLLN [(3c)]. Third, there is something at least intui-
tively satisfying about the I-S model in its claim that the explan-
ans should provide us with evidence from which the explanan-
dum [(3d)] can be inferred with high probability or with "practi-
cal certainty" [(inductive support (r = 1))].[…] Thus, the final
component of the new model of statistical explanation is the in-
ductive argument […]18.
Surprisingly the explanandum (3d) isn't not equivalent to Q! Q asked for an
explanation of a regularity. (3d) is a sentence describing the fact that the
system e has the property G (such and such fractal dimension) at t0 + θ. The
inductive step is not part of the explanandum expressed by (3d), but the
general occurence of our pattern was part of the explanandum expressed by
Q. One is a little surprised to learn that Batterman's own model is just an-
other (though shorter) explanation of one token of the pattern, an explana-
tion that could admittedly be provided by an ideal explanatory text as well.
To be fair, throwing the inductive argument-idea overboard provides us
with the explanation of Q. If we want an explanation for the general occur-
rence of our pattern, we might be able to show that all systems e of type E
(plays of the game, in our example) exhibit the crucial statistical properties
and hence we would arrive at a lawlike generalization similar to (3c), but
quantifying over systems of type E.
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It is absolutely true that no ideal explanatory text consisting of connected
DN-explanations for the result of each single dice throw and dot could ever
result in such a lawlike generalization. Luckily it doesn't have to. The ver-
sions of ideal explanatory texts that are discussed by Batterman are designed
to account for particular facts, not for lawlike generalizations. Neither Rail-
ton's deductive-nomological or deductive-nomological-probabilistic model,
nor Hempel's inductive-statistical model are applicable, since they are sim-
ply not intended to cope with statistical generalizations as explananda. The
model that would be adequate to Q is a deductive-statistical explanation, for
only here do we find an explanation of statistical regularities. It is not very
amazing that explicatory models for scientific explanations of particular
facts do not cover scientific explanations of regularities.
Could we provide a deductive-statistical explanation for Q in the sense of
an ideal explanatory text? Maybe Batterman has shown that we cannot. Let
us again consider his explanation (the way we have just redescribed it):
(4) Statistical-Deterministic-model for the explanation of regularities
(4a) A demonstration, through an analysis of the lawlike dynamical in-
stability of systems e of type E, that E possesses certain strong sta-
tistical properties SP.
(4b) ∀x ∀t [SPx,t → Prob(Gx,t + θ) = 1]; θ ≥ 0  
 (4d) ∀e of E ∀t [SPe,t → Prob(Ge,t + θ) = 1]; θ ≥ 0
(4a) certainly contains non-irreducible probabilities, since all considered
cases stem from the classical domain. Hence, on the ideal explanatory text
account we would have to replace them with laws, which are non-statistical,
but allow for the derivation of (4d). How should this be possible? It isn't
possible, but again, luckily it doesn't have to. Let's have another look at the
explanandum: (4d) contains probability assertions that are not irreducibly
probabilistic. Batterman would not claim that they are, since his point is (as
reconstructed here) to emphasize that these reducible probabilities are deriv-
able from regularities which equally contain reducible probabilities, and
whose reduction into a DN-text would not be explanatory anymore.
From the explanatory text point of view, (4d) is not a true statistical law,
but it is either false, or it is a non-statistical law, or it is not a law at all, sim-
ply because its probability assertions are non-irreducible. Take a look at all
three interpretations of (4d):
(a) The explanandum is false.
If (4d) is false, it is not surprising that we cannot derive it from true prem-
ises. This cannot be a challenge to our account, since no one would expect a
theory of scientific explanation to provide explanations for falsities. No
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ideal explanatory text can account for a false explanandum, but a false ex-
planandum should not be explicable by any model of scientific explanation.
(b) The explanandum is a non-probabilistic law.
Consider (4b) to be a shorthand for a more complex non-statistical law. This
would be possible, but at the same time it would mean that its more complex
relative is derivable from other (complex) non-statistical laws. Fully under-
standing the underlying mechanism would provide us with both. Again, this
can't be considered a challenge.
(c) The explanandum is not a law
Consider (4b) to be a mere descriptive report of observed relative frequen-
cies. In this case we already know that a conjunction of DN-texts is suffi-
cient to explain this observed relative frequency. No challenge here either.
Whatever you choose, we can account for it in the ideal explanatory text-
conception. I think Batterman has not succeeded in finding explananda
which must be judged inexplicable from our point of view, but explicable
from the view of some other model of scientific explanation.
5. Explanations are like salted peanuts ...
As a conclusion of the previous argument, let me briefly answer three ques-
tions (for the record) that might be left open:
(1) Do I say that all explanations which refer to some ergodic theorem
or that involve Bernoulli properties and laws like SLLN are non-
explanatory?
Surely not. On the contrary, I think that we can identify their explanatori-
ness very well19. Railton himself shows how ergodic theory can carry ex-
planatory information20:
For example, various proofs in ergodic theory and related results
show that if a gas is in an initial condition that obeys a relatively
few constraints, it will, over infinite time, spend most of its time
at or near equilibrium. This illuminates a modal feature of the
causal process involved and therefore a modal feature of the
relevant ideal explanatory text […].21
Batterman doubts that this strategy works, since the "modal feature" Railton
addresses would not be a feature of the causal process, but a feature of the
distribution of initial and boundary conditions.22 It might be that some limit
theorems exhibit modal features of the causal process, i.e. robustness against
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a certain range of variation among the initial and boundary conditions.
Some results in game theory could be interpreted in this way.23 Or we may
find the regularity in the distribution of the initial and boundary conditions
themselves. Either way: ergodic theory might be a helpful explanatory
shorthand for things that surely would take a while to be fully spelled out in
an ideal explanatory text. But again: this text is an ideal. No one expects any
actual explanation to be complete in this sense. What I had to show was
simply that the ideal explanatory text wouldn't leave out something impor-
tant some other explanation could include.
(2) Do I say that all these statistical-deterministic explanations are lit-
erally false?
In a way I do. Just as some of the explanations in figure 1, these statistical-
deterministic explanations could be misleading if taken literally. Knowing
that the ascribed probabilities are meant in a measure theoretic sense, or rep-
resent statistical distributions of initial conditions only, they are nevertheless
perfectly okay: they tell us in what direction we have to look for a "deeper"
explanation.
(3) Has Batterman failed to present a counterexample because he at-
tacks a tautological, interdependent net of definitions?
No, he indeed attacks a substantial claim. My presentation of the ideal ex-
planatory text-conception shows that the "mildly reductionistic" claim (I) is
indeed a mere definition. Claim (II) on the other hand is contentful: "ex-
planatory value" is an intuitive notion that we used to compare the two con-
ceptions of scientific explanation. (II) would have been falsified, if Batter-
man had shown that there are explanations of events the ideal explanatory
text couldn't account for. This didn't happen though. What (II) nevertheless
implies (and what Batterman failed to undermine) is that you cannot cut the
route toward further reduction if you know that the underlying mechanism is
different from the one you refer to in your explanans. It is always legitimate
and explanatory to keep asking why-questions, leading in the same direc-
tion, toward more fundamental levels (if there are any). It is in this sense
that explanations are like salted peanuts. Getting one doesn't make you stop
asking for one; usually just the reverse is true.
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1 Note that this kind of mild reductionism doesn't include the claim that for
every explanatory mechanism M there is some microphysical mechanism
M' such that M' explains M, nor such that M is reducible to M' or any-
thing like that. It is a mere epistemologically motivated principle that im-
plies nothing about the ontology of our world.
2 E might of course have a couple of other merits than explanatory ones
which make it more appropriate in a certain situation. But this is prag-
matics again.
3 See Batterman 2000a, Batterman 2000, Batterman 1998, Batterman
1992. I'll concentrate on the argument presented in Batterman 1992.
4 For the problems Hempel's account has to face, see Salmon 1990 and
Schurz 1995/1996.
5 Plus his above mentioned idea that all explanations are basically either
deductively or inductively valid arguments with the explanans as conclu-
sion.
6 Railton 1978, 212: "After all, why should it be explicable that a genu-
inely random wheel of fortune with 99 red stops and 1 black stop came to
halt on red, but inexplicable that it halted on black? Worse, on Hempel’s
view, halting at any particular stop would be inexplicable, even though
the wheel must halt at some particular stop in order to yield the explica-
ble outcome red."
7 Although it took him a while to see it. Railton 1978, FN2.
8 Railton himself distinguishes between deterministic and indeterministic
systems in the following way: "Let us say rather loosely that a system is
deterministic if, for any one instant, its state is physically compatible
with only one (not necessarily different) state at each other instant. A
system is indeterministic otherwise, but lawfully so if a complete de-
scription of its state at some one instant plus all true laws together entail
a distribution of probabilities over possible states at later times." Railton
1978, FN1.
9 Read "Prob(Gx,t + θ) = r" as "the probability that x has the property G at
t + θ equals r".
10 Railton 1981, 247.
11 Since 1981 there has been progress towards a semantic theory of infor-
mation. I won’t go into details since I think that the intuitive grasp of the
idea should be sufficient for the point I wish to make. For a detailed
analysis I recommend Perry/Israel 1990.
12 Batterman 1992, 325.
13 Taken from Batterman 1992, 326.
14 Batterman 1992, 325.
15 To be precise, it won't harm my point to any higher degree than Batter-
man's. If it isn't a contentful explanation, but a mere mathematical exam-
ple, the coming about of the sequences considered doesn't make a differ-
36
ence. But in this case the example doesn't count as a counterexample and
is worthless as an illustration for Batterman's point, too.
16 If the die always landed on "2", or if we had repeating sequences of "1",
"2", "3", "1", "2", "3", ...
17 Batterman 1992, 333.
18 Batterman 1992, 343-344.
19 One has deeply misunderstood the explanatory text-account if one thinks
that Railton claimed that the statistical regularities of statistical mechan-
ics wouldn't be explanatory.
20 I do not wish to enter the discussion whether ergodicity and ergodic the-
ory have any significance for explaining why equilibrium statistical me-
chanics works. Compare Batterman 1998, Sklar 1973, Earman/Rédei
1996.
21 Railton 1981, 251.
22 Batterman 1992, 345.
23 Batterman himself addresses this point in D'Arms/Batterman/Górny
1999.
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